Financial repression disables banks and prevents them from using their full potential (James Ang 2014). Ronald I. McKinnon (1973) and Edward S. Shaw (1973) consider financial liberalization to be the backbone of economic reforms in developing countries. Developing countries should liberalize their economies to promote their banking and financial sectors and to stimulate economic growth. In the early 90s, new approaches supporting financial liberalization were proposed to identifiy the possible relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth concluding that financial system needs to be liberalized to support economic growth (Silke Bumann, Niels Hermes, and Robert Lensink 2013). These studies indicated that developing banks and financial markets have a positive effect on economic growth because it allows allocation of more savings to investment. Indeed, financial liberalization facilitates economic integration and interdependence between economies (Essahbi Essaadi, Jamel Jouini, and Wajih Khallouli 2009; Agnieszka Gehringer 2015).
Review of the Literature

Financial Liberalization and Growth
Endogenous growth models concluded that financial development has a positive impact on economic growth since it allows efficient allocation of savings for investment in emerging countries, in which financing the economy is made through the banking sector. The government should liberalize its financial system to make profits from financial openness because financial systems of these countries are under the control of public authorities. With the access to economic growth, the ultimate goal of these countries, goes through an intermediate stage of economic openness. The recent relevant literature recommends the liberalization of the economy to achieve high savings returns and benefits for investors. Therefore, to explain this positive influence on growth, it follows that mobilizing savings, effectively diversifying risk, evaluating investment projects are all functions of the financial system. Shandre Thangavelu and Ang (2004) corroborate this view and argue that financial development significantly determines economic growth. Saumitra Bhaduri (2005) shows that financial liberalization that reduces the role of the state in the economy changes investment patterns. Arturo José Galindo, Fabio Schiantarelli, and Andrew Murray Weis (2007) studying developing countries, concluded that there is a strong positive relationship between financial liberalization and efficient allocation of investment. For Amira Guermazi (2014) , financial liberalization alleviates financial constraints on firms and thereby reduces sensitivity of investments to cash flow. Mishkin (2006) points out that financial openness stimulates domestic financial development and economic growth. Financial intermediation positively affects savings and investment through several channels. Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) support the hypothesis that financial intermediaries play an important role in reducing moral hazard and adverse selection. Abdul Abiad, Nienke Oomes, and Kenichi Ueda (2008) state that financial liberalization has a "quantitative" effect, which manifests itself in an increase in savings and investment. Moreover, financial liberalization strongly correlates with the efficient allocation of savings while financial repression leads to the opposite effect.
Rima Turk Ariss (2008) points out that financial liberalization of the banking system increases internal competition between domestic banks and allows banks to expand their offer to customers at very competitive prices. These assumptions are consistent with the earlier work of Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) , who agreed that an economy with a government-controlled banking system has a low level of financial development and as a result a slow economic growth. Edwards (2007) Crises of banks' balance sheets will feed contagion and a retreat to safer investments, i.e. "flight to quality", and therefore will generate capital flight. The extreme volatility of international capital markets and investors' herd behavior lead to reluctance and panic. Capital flight will mechanically result in a pressure on currency, doubling capital flight in case of a currency crisis, which in turn leads to a higher effective interest rate supported by speculative entities indebted in foreign currency and a self-reinforcing crisis process. Mariassunta Giannetti (2007) argues that liberalizing capital inflows can disrupt the stability of banks in emerging economies. Consequently, liberalization reduces the overall well-being of the economy. Banks then massively invest without assessing risk. Financial liberalization, therefore, boosts market imperfections. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) found that financial liberalization leads to cycles (booms and crashes), which is very important in the short-term and stable in the long-term. If a country imposes barriers, short-term effects are not very obvious. For example, just after liberalization, booms increased by 40% in developing countries and by 55% in developed countries compared to the period of financial repression. However, crashes increased by 30% in emerging markets in the short-term. André A. Levchenko, Ranciere, and Mathias Thoenig (2008) studied 56 industrialized and emerging countries over the 1963-2003 period and concluded that financial liberalization has a dual effect: growth and crises. The effect on growth is temporary and non-permanent as some countries have been hit by crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) concluded that banking crises are preceded by financial liberalization. The authors showed that 18 of the 26 banking crises have been preceded by an adoption of financial liberalization. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) argued that the liberalization of the local financial sector increases the fragility likelihood of the banking system.
The relationship between banking crises and financial liberalization can be explained by a failure to implement sound banking governance. Ilan Noy (2004) conducted an empirical investigation on a panel of 61 countries over the period . The author concluded that financial liberalization implemented with a lax prudential regulation has encouraged banks to take excessive risk. As for Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008) , they studied a panel of 39 countries and 203 banks to determine the role of banking governance and concluded that strengthening
Empirical Study
Data and Model
The empirical relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth is stronger than what the theoretical literature admits. These studies make use of traditional econometric methods (ordinary least square, GMM in difference and GMM in system).
The sample consists of a set of 54 panel of OECD (20) and developing and emerging countries (34) by testing the relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth over the period . The sample period is too large to catch the effect of financial liberalization on economic growth. The PSTR model is defined as follows (see Appendix 1 for the procedure of estimation):
where, GDP is the real GDP per capita growth. CRISIS is systemic banking crisis (see Appendix 2). x it is k-dimensional vector of growth (inflation, trade, government consumption and population). z it is the transition variable. This study uses five measures: banking supervision, law and order, corruption, deposit insurance and government stability. FLIB is financial liberalization. There is also no consensus in the literature and many studies use different definitions for financial liberalization. According to Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) , financial liberalization has three dimensions: real domestic liberalization, financial markets liberalization and capital account liberalization. Rebecca M. Neumann, Penl Ron, and Tanku Altin (2009) used a similar classification: the degree of financial liberalization is measured by the index composed of the domestic financial sector, the financial markets and the capital account and which varies between 1 and 3, for each component, a value of 1 indicates no liberalization, 2 indicates partial liberalization, and 3 indicates full liberalization. De jure index and de facto index: a country is classified as either liberalized (value of 1) or restricted (value of 0). The last measure is the Financial Reform Index from the recent International Monetary Fund Financial Reforms database proposed by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008) . In this study, this measure for financial liberalization is used. A definition of all the variables and their sources is provided in Appendix 3. Table 1 provides summary statistics for all the data used in this study. 
Estimation Procedure of PSTR Model
Referring to Meriam Brahim and Rachdi (2014) 
Econometric Results
For the linearity test, we will use in this study the Fisher LM test (Step 1). Referring to the LM test in Table 2 , the null hypothesis is that the model is linear is rejected for transition variables for all, OECD and other countries. The relationship between financial liberalization and growth is non-linear is concluded. Therefore, a PSTR model is used to estimate that relationship, after carefully choosing between PESTR (Panel Exponential Smooth Transition Regression) and PLSTR (Panel Logistic Smooth Transition Regression) family of models. This test is presented in Table 3 ( Step 2). Once the linearity test and the test of the choice between PESTR and PLSTR are used, the problem is to identify the number of transition functions. The methodology of sequential test F-statistic LM F (Step 3) is generally used for the no remaining nonlinearity test (test of number of regimes). This test is presented in Table 4 . We find that the model with one threshold (two regimes) adequately captures the non-linear relationship. Thus, a PSTR model with one transition function seems to be appropriate in this paper. Table 5 presents PSTR estimates using the Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) method for the all, OECD and developing and emerging countries (Step 4). It was found out that the shift between the two extreme regimes occurs around the location parameter c (for all regressions, the 5 location parameters seem far from their respective mean values reported in Table 1 ). It is concluded that countries with good governance and institutions can exploit the advantages of financial liberalization on growth. The slope  appears to be low for banking supervision, corruption, deposit insurance and government stability (when the threshold variable is deposit insurance, the highest value is 8.1436 for the full sample, 8.003 for OECD countries and 8.9177 for developing and emerging countries). It is concluded that a smooth transition and consequently the PSTR is well adapted. It means that in condition to those variables, the relationship between financial liberalization and growth cannot be reduced to a limited number of regimes. For law and order, the slope appears to be sharp (41.9573 for all countries, 19.5449 for OECD countries and 14.3838 for developing and emerging countries). The transition is rather rough and the PTR framework is indicated to assess financial liberalization-growth nexus the slope parameter tends towards the infinity.
Empirical Findings
It is concluded that the signs of most controlled variables are overall consistent with previous literature. The negative and significant coefficient for lagged GDP both at the global and sub-groups of countries confirm the use of the dynamic framework. The coefficient on banking crisis φ 0 is negative and statistically significant across all regressions for total group of countries or the sub-group of countries. This result suggests that, financial and banking crises negatively affect the performance of banks and consequently the rate of economic growth. Earlier empirical studies provide strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that financial liberalization increases the likelihood of banking crises. Better governance of banking institutions to reduce the probability of occurrence of banking crises was made by reducing problems following financial liberalization.
Similar to expectation, in all groups (entire panel of 54 countries; OECD of 20 countries; developing and emerging group of 34 countries), an instable direct impact of financial liberalization on growth, measured by  0 , significant in many regressions is found. This outcome depends largely on the level of governance and institutions in each country. This result is consistent with some of the studies mentioned in Section 1. The weak and inefficient institutions and governance in developing countries increase the likelihood of financial and banking crises. Newly liberalized country is more likely to experience a banking crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008) confirm that the establishment of financial liberalization for some countries leads to more fragile banking sector and aggravates economic growth. Edwards (2007) approves this conclusion in Latin American countries: GDP per capita has been reduced due the recurrence of external crises. Thus, in the absence of an efficient supervisory structure, financial liberalization is more likely to have adverse effects on economic growth.
The direction of the effects of liberalization and its interaction with banking governance and institutional quality depend on the sample and model used. All transition variables found in this study are: FLIB-economic growth coefficient  1 is negative and statistically insignificant for some transition variables with values ranging between -0.0008 and 1.0068 for total group of countries, between -2.3354 and 0.722 for OECD group and between -0.4850 and 1.6394 for developing emerging countries. This implies that an increase of the transition variables entails an increase of FLIB-growth coefficient. In countries with high level of institutions, there is positive effect of FLIB on economic growth. This empirical result suggests that better banking supervision, law and order, lower corruption and better bureaucracy and government stability help increase the rate of economic growth. Adequate banking supervision incites healthy and sustainable economic growth. Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) concluded that good governance guarantees efficient allocation of savings. Prudential banking regulation is positively linked to stability and healthy and durable economic performance (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2004; Ahn and Choi 2009; Angkinand 2009; Hasan, Wachtel, and Zhou 2009). Noy (2004) and Menkhoff and Suwanaporn (2007) note a process of financial liberalization concomitantly followed by a reinforcement of prudential regulation making it possible to reduce banking crises probability.
This result, so far, confirms the idea that good banking governance and institutions (respect of rules of law and banking supervision, low level of corruption and political stability) is considered one of the main factors for outcome maximization for all countries. It is pointed out that high quality of institutions influences financial liberalization and consequently growth. When institutions are strong, the legal system works effectively. This result is quite consistent with Abdullahi Ahmed (2013) that finds the legal institutions and protection of property rights are important in explaining growth and financial development when investigating the role of financial liberalization in promoting financial deepening and economic growth in 21 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1981-2009. Overall, financial liberalization, governance and institutions go hand in hand and economic growth is fostered by the effectiveness of institutions. For all economies (high-income; middle-income and low-income countries), an improvement of rules of governance and good institutions lead to a greater increase in the outcome growth. Developing and emerging countries need to achieve a minimum level of institutional quality in order to benefit from the advantages offered by financial liberalization. Over all, the main result of this study shows that a better contribution of financial liberalization to economic growth requires the interrelationship and the complementarily between financial liberalization and governance.
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
Motivated by the important role of financial liberalization on economic growth, this paper has shed new light in understanding this relationship by focusing on the role played by the governance and institutional quality. Using a panel of 54 countries (20 OECD countries and 34 developing and emerging countries) for the period 1985-2010, this paper highlights the impact of financial liberalization on economic growth based on the governance and institutional quality. The PSTR is adopted for five measures of governance and institutions quality (banking supervision, law and order, corruption, deposit insurance and government stability). The empirical evidence captured by the PSTR framework confirms that the effectiveness of governance and institutions promotes economic growth.
The findings in this paper were interpreted with caution because the estimation results appear to be sensitive to the smoothness of transition. It also provides a hint for the sequence of reform in developing and emerging countries. While it is an ultimate goal, strengthening governance and institution, nonetheless, should not be an urgent concern when the economy is still stranded by multiple banking and financial crises. It is more urgent for all countries to strengthen governance. In this context, the gains will be much larger on economic growth.
The results may have some practical implications for econometric modelling as well as for policy makers in stimulating economic growth. Generally, the analysis shows that the process of financial liberalization must concomitantly followed by a reinforcement of prudential regulation and the legal system to reduce banking crises and to sustain economic growth.
